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PICKING AND CHOOSING TEXT: LESSONS FOR STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
Victoria Nourse*
Abstract
Textualists claim that they follow statutory text. This Article argues
that, in practice, textualists often create meaning rather than find it.
Deploying the analytics of linguistic philosophy, this Article takes a deep
dive into textualist methodology. The philosophy of language reveals
what legal scholarship has left submerged: The very choice of text can
put the thumb on the scales of any interpretation. When one pulls a term
out of a statute and isolates it from the rest of the text (what I call
“isolationist” method), this decontextualization offers the opportunity for
adding and subtracting meaning from the statute by “pragmatic
enrichment.” Only by working out these enrichments is it possible to
assess whether the hypothesized meanings are cancelled by the rest of
the statute. In the end, we need to ask of all interpreters, including
textualists, whether they are making rather than finding the meaning of
statutes.
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INTRODUCTION
It is conventional wisdom, by now, in statutory interpretation theory,
to argue that the use of legislative history is unwise because it allows
judges to pick and choose their friends in the legislative record.1 What is
not so conventional wisdom, but should be, is that it is also possible to
pick and choose one’s friends in statutory text. Anecdotal evidence of this
can be gleaned from prominent statutory cases of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s recent terms, from the health care case, King v. Burwell,2 to the
fish case, Yates v. United States,3 to last Term’s case on prior sex
offenses, Lockhart v. United States.4 In each case, there were warring
texts. In King, the law’s opponents focused on the term “state” arguing
that “federal” tax exchanges were excluded from tax benefits.5 In Yates,
the government isolated the term “tangible object” in a financial fraud
statute.6 In Lockhart, the defendant argued that the phrase “minor or
ward” modified an entire string of offenses.7 Their opponents and
members of the Supreme Court all emphasized equally small snippets—
“such Exchange,”8 “records [or] documents,”9 and “abusive sexual
conduct.”10 This is not unique to statutory interpretation, nor to those
wedded to textualist methods: Query whether the Justices of yesteryear
would have spent so much time as the majority in the recess appointments
case did on the term “the.”11
There should be something more troubling about reducing large and
important laws, not to mention individual liberty, to such small chunks of
text. These are Supreme Court cases, after all. Individual liberty and
1. This is attributed to a statement made by Judge Harold Leventhal of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History
Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813 (1998).
2. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
3. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
4. 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016).
5. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488 (explaining petitioners’ argument emphasizing the term
“state”).
6. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1091 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The term ‘tangible object’ is broad,
but clear.”).
7. Lockhart, 135 S. Ct. at 961–62.
8. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (discussing the phrase “such Exchange”).
9. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1081, 1085 (plurality opinion) (discussing “records” and
“documents”).
10. Lockhart, 135 S. Ct. at 963 (explaining minor only modifies “abusive sexual conduct”).
11. NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). Typically, cases of constitutional first
impression focus on the constitutional text. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
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major statutory reforms are at stake. Put more concretely, it should seem
strange that a reform affecting one-sixth of the American economy should
stand or fall on a five-letter word.12 Nevertheless, despite the stakes, the
cases, or at least the arguments leading to the cases, focused on what most
citizens would find strange—tiny texts. Elsewhere, I have dubbed this
method with the pejorative term “petty” textualism.13 Here, I try to
formalize the concept of “petty textualist method,” by calling it
isolationist (which is its effect)14 to distinguish it from the traditional
form of “whole text” analysis.
Little serious analytic attention has been paid to isolationist method.
This is unfortunate because it is everywhere: It infects arguments and
opinions from all sides of the political spectrum and without regard to
interpretive philosophy. It is deployed by textualists and purposivists
alike in statutory interpretation cases.15 It also infects arguments
characterized as originalist or textualist in constitutional interpretation.
Of course, one can be a “textualist” or an “originalist” without ascribing
to isolationist method, just as one can be a statutory purposivist or living
constitutionalist and adopt textual isolationism. Nevertheless, the precise
relationship between how one chooses text and these methods has not
been elaborated in any great detail, making both textualism and
originalism undertheorized.16
Isolationist textual method deserves greater scrutiny. To fully
appreciate this, however, requires the analytic muscle of the modern
philosophy of language, beginning with, but not limited to, the work of
philosopher Paul Grice,17 whose mode of analysis has become interesting

12. National health care spending constituted approximately one-sixth of the economy in
2014. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2016 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 30 (2016),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51580-ltbo-one-col-2
.pdf.
13. See generally VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY (2016)
(discussing petty textualism analysis and its effect on statutory interpretation).
14. One might think the term “isolationist” less than rhetorically neutral as it suggests
analogues to the cold war between the United States and Russia. The term best fits what I am
trying to say, however, because “isolation” is the first step to pragmatic enrichment.
15. I use the terms “textualist” and “purposivist” to describe the principal theories of
statutory interpretation used by academics and judges. Textualists stick to the text and refuse to
look to legislative materials; purposivists view the text as effecting a purpose and generally are
willing to look at legislative materials.
16. For an application of this theory to originalist approaches to the President’s power, see
Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case of Executive
Power, 106 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2018).
17. See generally PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989) (discussing modern
Anglo–American language philosophy); STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRESUMPTIVE MEANINGS: THE
THEORY OF GENERALIZED CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE (2000) (explaining the processes that
underlie presumptions in communication).
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to very different constitutional scholars.18 The philosophy of language
helps us to see that the very act of textual isolation leads to unstated
implications, and pragmatic enrichment of text.19 It also helps us to see
that these implications can be quite false based on an examination of the
whole text. The whole text can in fact “take back” the silent implications
of the isolating procedure, either by creating contrary enrichments or
implied cancellations.20
My ultimate point is that isolationist method, and the pragmatic
enrichment that follows, can be a spurious form of interpretation, whether
deployed by a textualist or purposivist. If I am correct, “isolating”
textualism allows interpreters to, in effect, add meaning at the initial stage
of interpretation, based not on the actual text of the statute, but based on
“pragmatic” inference. That inference may have nothing to do with the
actual text, or the whole text; it may even “cover” one’s preferred policy
preference. If this is correct, then “isolating textualism” can lead to selffulfilling results: Choosing one piece of text over another can amount to
assuming that which one is trying to prove. This is important for all
interpreters, not simply self-described textualists or originalists. All
interpretive methods are capable of “cherry-picking” text and “cherrypicking” pragmatic enrichment, thus violating the principles of restraint
and fixity common both to textualism in statutory interpretation and to
originalism in constitutional interpretation.21
Part I begins with the basic principles of linguistic philosophy and
pragmatic inference, with special attention to, but not limited to, Gricean
implicature, a particular form of pragmatic enrichment. This Part applies
these principles to two recent Supreme Court cases, King v. Burwell and
United States v. Yates,22 to show how isolationist textualism trades upon
enriched meanings that may be contrary to the meaning of the whole text.
This Part shows how interpreters pragmatically enrich text. The analysis
raises a serious question for textualism as it appears that interpreters are
deciding cases as much by their own additions or enrichments of the text
18. John Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment,
Implicature, and Implied Powers, 101 VA. L. REV. 1063, 1069 (2015); Lawrence B. Solum,
Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1129–30 (2015); Lawrence
B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 519–20
(2013); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV.
1935, 1955 (2013).
19. To be more precise, the act of textual isolation leads to the misidentification of apparent
implicatures and other pragmatic enrichments. My thanks to the linguist Nick Allott for this and
many other careful interventions with this text.
20. For a path-breaking application of “cancellation” to constitutional law, and the
necessary and proper clause, see Mikhail, supra note 18, at 1081, 1088.
21. See, e.g., John McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 3 U.
ILL. L. REV. 737, 755 (2002).
22. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
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as by the text itself. Can textualism really be textualism if the interpreter’s
enrichments are doing so much work? Can textualism in practice be
textualism in theory, if interpreters inject their preferred policy positions
into the text by virtue of pragmatic inference?
Part II urges that this is a problem for all interpreters, without regard
to apparent political or interpretive affiliation. A wide array of opinions
and arguments and cases depend on textual choice and enriched meaning.
This raises questions about whether interpreters are pushing their
preferred “constructions” of text into claims that what they are doing is
finding “plain meaning.” As this Part shows, unless one acknowledges
pragmatic enrichment, it is perfectly possible for a committed textualist
to inject her preferred purpose into the text via pragmatic enrichment,
doing precisely what, theoretically, she decries. It is also perfectly
possible, and more likely, that a committed purposivist will do the same
thing, but “cover” their purposivism by injecting it in text.
Part III puts this analysis in a broader context of the information
economy used in statutory interpretation. Enriching meaning by
implication depends upon economy of expression; the interpreter is
forced to add or subtract information because of the lack of information.
Thus, the narrower the information economy (i.e., reducing the amount
of relevant information to small bits of text) the more likely the silent use
of pragmatic enrichment. This Part concludes by comparing isolationist
method to conventional pluralist analyses. This Part argues that pluralist
tools may have an unseen virtue: They add information to the interpretive
economy and thus can resist or defeat apparent, but falsely enriched,
meanings. If deployed properly, they can disconfirm unstated, silent,
statutory meanings that the whole text rejects. Put bluntly and
counterintuitively, pluralism tends to increase the likelihood that the
interpreter will honor the whole text. This challenges, indeed reverses,
the conventional idea of pluralist method as an undisciplined grab bag.
Part IV considers some objections to these claims. First, some might
argue that it is impossible to interpret any language without isolating
particular terms. This objection simply shows the importance of the
problem: Interpreters should be much more attentive to their pragmatic
enrichments—how their choice of terms may lead to false, or at least
implausible, enrichment. Here, this Part considers the age-old “vehicles
in the park” hypothetical and shows how the isolation of the term
“vehicle” creates interpretive problems that only law professors would
take seriously. Second, for those who believe this entire argument is
pitched at an incredibly picayune level, one can only beat a formalist
argument by taking formalist theory seriously, and textualism is a formal
theory. If judicial meaning is added even at the smallest of levels—at the
level of word choice and pragmatic enrichment of those words—then
textualism as currently practiced cannot be as constraining as its
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proponents insist. So-called “plain texts” turn out to be constructions of
meaning that are not in fact in the text, often rejected by the whole text,
and in some cases, purposivism-in-false-textualist guise.
I. PRAGMATIC ENRICHMENT: GRICE AND BEYOND
By now, interpreters, including those who call themselves “new”
textualists, agree that text must be understood in context.23 Take the word
“fifth,” which appears seemingly incapable of ambiguity—it is the
number 5, after all. By manipulating the context in which the term “fifth”
appears, however, we can see that it could mean many very different
things. In the context of the Constitution, “fifth” typically implies the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. In the context of a liquor store,
“fifth” suggest the size of a liquor container.24 “Fifth” is a relative term,
both in quantitative terms (larger than fourth and smaller than sixth), and
in contextual terms, in that it takes much of its meaning from context.
Semanticists have come to accept this point because of the potential
ambiguity of even the tiniest of terms, such as the word “and.”25 Although
the line between semantics and pragmatics—two schools of linguistic
thought—remains a perpetual source of dispute,26 it is by now well
known that simple words like the conjunction “and” can lead to different
meanings, even without the kind of contextual change described above.
Take the following two sentences:
(1) The Lone Ranger jumped on his horse and rode into the
sunset.
(2) The Lone Ranger and Tonto rode into the sunset.27
We can with no trouble reverse the “and” in sentence (2) as follows:
“Tonto and the Lone Ranger rode into the sunset.” Put in other words,
“and” has the conventional meaning of a connector and is logically
reversible. One cannot perform that operation on Sentence (1), however,
because “and” has a different meaning; it appears to mean “follow in
time.”28 It would make little sense to say, “The Lone Ranger rode into the
23. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 40 (2012) (“The soundest legal view seeks to discern literal meaning in context.”).
24. Fifth, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=fifth
(last visited June 27, 2017).
25. I refer here to the loose sense of ambiguity—having different meanings in different
contexts.
26. See, e.g., Josh Dever, The Revenge of the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction, 27 PHIL.
PERSP. 104, 104 (2013).
27. This is a variation on an example explained in STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRAGMATICS 108
(1983).
28. It is possible that the work being done by “and” is superfluous here, that the meaning
comes about by the simple ordering of phrases. See ROBYN CARSTON, THOUGHTS AND
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sunset and jumped on his horse.” Based on such an example, even those
focused on semantic meaning have accepted that context is important,
even if that context is limited to surrounding text.
A. Enriched Meaning
Linguistic philosophy offers some important tools to assess semantic
context. For purposes of this Article, the term “pragmatic enrichment”
means the kind of addition philosophers of language describe when they
talk about interpretation. Pragmatic enrichment can go by many different
names, including implicature, impliciture, explicature, presupposition,
and others.29 In my terms, “enriched meaning” refers to the addition of
apparent meaning to a literal text. So, for example, if I say “fifth” and the
interpreter reads this as the “Fifth Amendment to the Constitution,” she
has used her context (the legal one) to add apparent meaning to the word
“fifth.”
Almost all communication requires some form of pragmatically
enriched meaning. These meanings can be true, false, and cancellable. To
understand this idea, let us consider the kind of examples used by the
famous linguistic philosopher Paul Grice who introduced the notion of
the linguistic implicature.30 The classic example is a recommendation
letter. Imagine that Professor Eskridge writes a letter as follows: “Dear
Judge Posner, Susan X has attended class regularly.” Given the context
of a letter of recommendation, the implicature is that Susan is not a very
good student. Of course, the letter does not say anything of the kind. It
simply says that Susan attended class. The background context—our
assumptions about the standard letter of recommendation—provides the
implicature, the meaning of the letter. If Professor Eskridge were to add
to the letter, “and I believe Susan X is the best student I have ever taught,”
then the implicature would disappear. Grice called this notion, essential
to the idea of implicature, cancellation.31
From Grice’s example, we can glean an important feature of meaning:
the power of unstated background context. In the example, normal
conventions of recommendation-letter writing govern its meaning.
Notice that the meaning comes, as well, from what is absent from the
text—what is omitted. Providing a small amount of information about the
UTTERANCES: THE PRAGMATICS OF EXPLICIT COMMUNICATION 222 (2002). My point is simply that
semantic context can change even the most apparently obvious of terms.
29. Salah Mohammed Salih, Nuances of Implicitness, 2 INT’L J. EDUC. INVESTIGATIONS 126,
126 (2015).
30. Implicature, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (June 24, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/implicature/.
31. Mikhail, supra note 18, at 1073–75 (using a similar example drawn from Grice).
Cancellation comes in two varieties, one explicit and the other contextual. The examples that
follow are contextual cancellations.
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candidate suggested something negative. This principle, however, can be
generally stated in more conventional terms. When we interpret language,
we bring stereotypical conventional background assumptions to ascribe
meaning, to add and enrich compact expression. Call this “pragmatic”
enrichment of meaning.
The theory of pragmatic enrichment has developed a good deal in the
post-Gricean era.32 Even those who focus more on traditional grammar
and semantics have come to recognize that the concept of pragmatic
enrichment exists. So, for example, take the statement, “Some of my
students did well on the exam.” The apparent implication—technically
an “implicature”—is that most of the students did not do well on the
exam. Notice that the statement “some of the students did well on the
exam” does not say that “most of the students did not do well.” It is
implied, not stated, and without spelling it out as I have, it would be silent.
Notice also that the pragmatic enrichment, the meaning that comes from
context, could be cancelled if I added information that “some of my
students did well on the exam, but most did very well.”
Cancellation is a key feature of pragmatic enrichment more
generally.33 It reflects a default reasoning system that is defeasible. 34 As
linguist and philosopher of language Stephen Levinson has described it,
generalized implicatures “are inferences that appear to go through in the
absence of information to the contrary; but additional information to the
contrary may be quite sufficient to cause them to evaporate.”35 Levinson
goes on to argue that many generalized implicatures result from a
stereotypical contrast set.36 So, for example, in our most recent example
“some of my students did well on the exam,” the background contrast set
is “some” versus “all.” The contrasting set (some, all) leads to the
implicature that “only some” (not all) of the students did well.

32. On generalized versus particularized implicatures, and Grice’s embrace of the
generalized as well as the particularized, see LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 18 (quoting Grice’s
William James Lectures (Grice 1989)). Even those philosophers of language who disagree with
Grice’s maxims believe in the concept of enriching meaning by inference. See, e.g., DAN SPERBER
& DEIDRE WILSON, MEANING AND RELEVANCE 309–14 (2012) (“We are not denying that a
statement of the form ‘ . . . some . . . ’ may in some cases carry an implicature of the form ‘ . . . not
all . . . .’”).
33. LEVINSON, supra note 27, at 114 (“[Grice] isolates five characteristic properties of which
the first, and perhaps the most important, is that they are cancellable, or more exactly
defeasible.”).
34. Id.
35. LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 42.
36. Id.
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Pragmatic enrichment may be linguistic boilerplate,37 but Grice’s
work has been controversial. He is well-known for positing four types of
conversational maxims: manner, quantity, relevance, and quality.38 His
followers have not necessarily accepted any or all of these principles. His
detractors have rejected the maxims altogether.39 In statutory
interpretation, the maxims have been applied but with limited success.40
One need not engage in the great maxim debate, however, to accept the
principle that inferences can enrich the meaning of text, whether the
inferences are called implicatures, implicitures, or derivations from
explicatures.41 Textbooks on semantics (roughly the study of grammar
and syntax) and pragmatics (roughly the study of language in context)
teach Grice’s notion of an implicature as pragmatic enrichment.
Pragmatic enrichment is featured in texts in the overlapping fields of
semantics,42 pragmatics,43 and the philosophy of language.44 Because this

37. See, e.g., John A. Hawkins, On (In)definite Articles: Implicatures and
(Un)grammaticality Prediction, 27 J. LINGUISTICS 405, 405 (1991); Liza Verhoeven & Leon
Horsten, On the Exclusivity Implicature of ‘Or’ or on the Meaning of Eating Strawberries, 81
STUDIA LOGICA 19, 19 (2005).
38. H. Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX & SEMANTICS 47 (Peter Cole &
Jerry L. Morgans eds., 1975).
39. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 35–39 (retheorizing Gricean maxims in terms of
three heuristics). Compare SPERBER & WILSON, supra note 32 (arguing that the maxims can be
reduced to a single concept of relevance), with LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 55–59 (rejecting the
Sperber/Wilson theory).
40. Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV.
1179, 1194–95. Geoffrey Miller’s analysis of canons shows brilliant historical connections
between the canons of construction and ancient religious interpretive principles, but his attempt
to explain canons of construction as a reflection of Gricean maxims has been criticized because
the maxims themselves are so unwieldy and unclear.
41. “Impliciture” is the term used by Kent Bach. Kent Bach, The Top 10 Misconceptions
About Implicature, in DRAWING THE BOUNDARIES OF MEANING: NEO-GRICEAN STUDIES IN
PRAGMATICS AND SEMANTICS IN HONOR OF LAURENCE R. HORN 21 (Betty J. Birner & Gregory
Ward eds., 2006). “Explicature” is associated with Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory. See
SPERBER & WILSON, supra note 32, at 160. Neither of these theorists deny that contextual
enrichment occurs by inference due to economy of expression.
42. See, e.g., JAMES R. HURFORD, ET AL., SEMANTICS: A COURSEBOOK, 21–26 (2d ed. 2007);
NICK RIEMER, INTRODUCING SEMANTICS 118–20 (2010); JOHN I. SAEED, SEMANTICS, 7.7 (4th ed.
2016).
43. See, e.g., YAN HUANG, PRAGMATICS 25–83 (2d ed. 2014); Laurence R. Horn,
Implicature, in THE HANDBOOK OF PRAGMATICS 3 (Laurence Horn & Gregory Ward eds., 2004).
See the list of pragmatics texts in MIRA ARIEL, DEFINING PRAGMATICS 95 (2010) (listing
implicature as a basic topic in most contemporary pragmatics texts).
44. WILLIAM G. LYCAN, Implicative Relations, in PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: A
CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 156 (2d ed. 2000); CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS 308–21 (Keith Brown et al. eds., 2010); KEY IDEAS IN LINGUISTICS
AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (Siobhan Chapman et al. eds., 2009).
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idea transcends Grice, or even neo-Gricean philosophy, this Article uses
the term “pragmatic enrichment theory.”45
There are good reasons to believe that the pragmatic enrichment
principle should play an important role in interpreting statutory text. The
basic idea is that speech is economical46: It communicates more than the
words themselves do. If all English speakers assume that “some” does
not mean “all,” then we obtain more information than the sentence uttered
encodes. So, “some of the students did well,” says in six words what a
pragmatically enriched meaning, once spelled out, says in twelve words:
“Some of the students did well and most did not do well.” Pragmatic
enrichment is essential to communication because communication
depends upon an information economy in which meaning is conveyed by
fewer words than would be required without enrichment.
Statutes and constitutions are forms of communication.
“[L]inguists . . . agree that a statute is an instrument of communication.”47
New textualists insist that drafters use language in many of the ways that
ordinary citizens do or at least as ordinary lawyers might.48 If ordinary
citizens typically enrich meaning with apparent context, it follows that
statutes will follow the same rule.49 Legislators aim to solve general
problems—end discrimination, stop hunger, freeze the debt.
Constitutional drafters must be even briefer if they are to create a
workable framework for the ages. However lengthy, every statute and
every constitution is economical in the sense that it might have been
longer if one sought, for example, to negate all possible implications.50
One might argue that constitutional or statutory drafters are not
engaged in a cooperative enterprise and therefore Grice’s principles of
cooperation should not apply to statutes or constitutions. As indicated
above, however, one need not accept Grice’s maxims or his theory of
cooperation to believe that pragmatic enrichment exists and needs to be
spelled out. Even those linguists who reject Grice’s maxims or reject the
45. Having said this, it is also important to note that there are different kinds of pragmatic
inference, and implicature is a particular kind of pragmatic inference. If I am using the term “state”
in the diplomat’s office, the context suggests that the meaning of “state” is a country in the world.
Philosophers of language might dispute whether state-as-country is an implicature or not, but they
would not dispute that there is a pragmatic enrichment—the background context has been used to
precisify meaning.
46. SPERBER & WILSON, supra note 32, at 60, 177.
47. Law and Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 800, 817 (1995) (statement of
Judith Levi).
48. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 434 (2005).
49. Nicholas Allott & Benjamin Shaer, Inference and Intention in Legal Interpretation, in
THE PRAGMATIC TURN IN LAW: INFERENCE AND INTERPRETATION 104–07 (Janet Giltrow et al. eds.,
2017).
50. See generally TIMOTHY ANDREW ORVILLE ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW (2000)
(arguing for the necessity of vagueness in law).
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term “implicature” believe that meaning can be enriched by adding
apparent context.51 Accepting the existence of “implicature” does not
require that one embrace a full or even partial theory of overt cooperation.
There is every reason to believe that statutory or constitutional drafters
have an overarching individual incentive to communicate: Why else
would each reduce their thoughts to text?52 Finally, for those who believe
statutes are contracts (an assumption I do not share since all parties bound
did not consent), contract theorists are no strangers to pragmatic
enrichment. As Professor Adam Kramer has argued, contractual
“communication” is only possible because of a “sophisticated process of
pragmatic inference.”53
To summarize: The philosophy of language suggests four principles
of value in determining meaning. First, pragmatic enrichments from
context are often silent. The word “fifth” is precisified to mean the “Fifth
Amendment” without the author saying, “I am now bringing legal context
to bear.” The letter writer does not say, “I am following conventions of
letter writing and providing you with all relevant information about the
candidate.” Second, pragmatic enrichment is not limited to institutional
contexts, cultural practices, or idiosyncratic one-off interactions; it is
linguistically generalizable. The statement, “Some of my students did
well on the exam,” implicates that “most did not do well” because of
background stereotypical contrast sets (some versus all) independent of
any particular grading practice or educational institution. Third, and
perhaps most importantly, apparent enriched meaning can be negated or
cancelled by conflicting enrichments. When the letter writer adds, “and
she is the best student I have ever taught,” or the professor says, “most
did very well,” the original apparent meaning (she is a bad student, most
students did not do well) is cancelled, defeated. Finally, because of
cancellation, apparent pragmatic enrichments may be entirely false. In the
letter writer’s example, it turns out to be false that the student is
unqualified, and in the grading example, it turns out to be false that most
students did poorly.

51. See Miller, supra note 40, at 1185–86.
52. To be sure, statutes and constitutions have multiple audiences. See generally NOURSE,
supra note 13 (explaining the far-reaching nature of statutes and constitutions). But as John
Ferejohn and Bill Eskridge argued long ago, members of Congress want to see their projects yield
results, and this gives them a basic incentive to draft statutes in ways that judges and
administrators will understand. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section
7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 535 (1992).
53. “[B]y harnessing, and then processing, more information than merely the text, more
meaning can be extracted at the other end of the interpretative process. The other information is
the ‘context.’” Adam Kramer, Common Sense Principles of Contract Interpretation (And How
We’ve Been Using Them All Along), 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 177 (2003).
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B. Isolationist Method and Pragmatic Enrichment
What then does the philosophy of language show us about
interpretation: It suggests that the very choice of text can lead to false or
contestable implications. Let us reverse our grading example. We have
the final statement, “Some of my students did well on the exam, but most
did very well.” Now assume that we take from this statement only the
first part of it: “Some of my students did well.” If we take only this
statement, isolating it from the rest of the text, we have created an illusory
implication that most of the students have not done well. 54 We know,
however, from the full statement, that this apparent implication or
enrichment is not what the speaker meant. The full statement says that
most students did very well. We now see the dangers of isolationist
readings of statutory or constitutional text: They are not part of the
speakers’ meaning; they cherry pick the text to create the interpreters’
meaning.
Let us turn to an actual case, the Supreme Court’s recent health care
statutory case, King v. Burwell.55 The political opponents of the health
care law based their argument, one the Chief Justice found to be “strong,”
on taking 4 words from a 900-plus-page statute, isolating the phrase
“established by the State,” in a sub-sub-sub (the Chief Justice’s words)
provision of the statute on tax credits.56 The argument was quite simple:
Since the tax statute gave credits for exchanges “established by the State,”
this meant that exchanges created by the federal government were not
covered.57 Under the exchange provisions of the statute, the states were
to create exchanges for citizens to buy health insurance but, if they did
not, then the federal government was to act in their place, to establish an
exchange “within the state.”58 To be sure, once the case reached the
Supreme Court, other arguments were added, but this was the core textual
argument.59 In theory, “state” has many meanings: It might mean “state
of injury” to a doctor, or “a country in the world” to a diplomat (the “state
of Israel”). In the context of an American law, however, the Chief Justice

54. The implication is apparent or illusory because the text has been taken out of context
by the act of isolation.
55. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
56. I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“[E]nrolled in through an Exchange established by the
State . . . .”); see King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495 (explaining that the tax statute was an “ancillary
provision: a sub-sub-sub section of the Tax Code”); id. (“Petitioners’ arguments about the plain
meaning of Section 36B are strong.”).
57. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012); see King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487 (“[I]f a State nonetheless
chooses not to establish its own Exchange, the Act provides that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services ‘shall . . . establish and operate such Exchange within the State.’” (citing 42
U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (alteration in original))).
59. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492.
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found that the term had a “strong” plain meaning, and was forced to find
an “ambiguity” in the statute, leading him to look to the statutory plan.60
Now, apply pragmatic enrichment analysis. The isolation of
“established by the State” in the tax statute leads to the following apparent
enriched meaning: “established only by the state.” Note that this is not
what the statute says. The statute says “established by the State.”61 The
pragmatic enrichment adds exclusivity—only by the state.62 From this
implication, it appears to follow that the statute excludes exchanges
created by the federal government. This implication is not what the statute
does in fact “say.” The law’s opponents’ argument is a pragmatic
enrichment gleaned from isolating the text, which intensifies and adds (1)
exclusivity (“only”) and (2) the stereotypical American legal contrast set
of state versus the federal government.
Implications that arise from isolating text can be cancelled by adding
more information. And, in fact, this is precisely what the rest of the statute
does when we look at the context of the whole statute. The statute does
not allow for the creation of exchanges “only” by the states; it provides
that the federal government may establish exchanges “within the State”
where the state itself does not create an exchange.63 Isolating “state” from
the tax provision led to the implication that, to receive benefits,
exchanges must be “established only by the states.” The state and federal
exchange provisions cancel the exclusivity implication: Since exchanges
may be established by the federal government, it follows that exchanges
are not established only by the states.
The original pragmatic enrichment is cancelled by textual provisions
spelling out the relationship between the federal and state exchanges—
that the federal government may stand in for the state.64 Let us call this
the “substitute” relationship: The federal government may act as state
substitute in setting up exchanges.65 When the state fails to create the
exchange, the federal exchange will operate “within a State,” and “such
exchange[s]” are covered by the Act.66 Again, this cancels the apparent
pragmatic enrichment that only states may create state exchanges. If this
analysis is correct, the purported textual argument made by the statute’s
opponents was not a textual argument, it was an argument made by
pragmatic enrichment, by adding meaning to the text that the rest of the
statute cancelled or at least negated. It is tempting to use the pejorative
60. Id. at 2495.
61. I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A).
62. See LEVINSON, supra note 27, at 107 (suggesting this exclusivity implicature as a
common gloss).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1).
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 6 [], Art. 3

1422

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

“petty textualism”67 to describe this case, but insults are not argument or
analysis. Pragmatic enrichment analysis helps us see why the opponents’
(and Supreme Court dissenters’) textual argument is not the kind of
“strong” argument the majority opinion dubbed it.68
Lest the health care law’s political intensity obscure the point,
consider a similar move made by the Obama administration in Yates v.
United States.69 This 2015 Supreme Court case involved the much more
pedestrian question whether concealing undersize fish (yes, fish) could
constitute an offense under a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley financial
reform law (SOX).70 There, the full statute read, “Whoever knowingly
alters, destroys, mutilates, . . . falsifies, or makes a false entry in any
record, document, or tangible object [with intent to impede a federal
investigation] . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than
20 years, or both.”71 The government’s argument, adopted by Justice
Kagan’s dissent, isolated the two words “tangible object,”72 leading to the
implication that the statute covers all tangible objects.73 Again, the statute
does not say “all tangible objects.” The background contrast set here is
all versus some.
The question is whether the whole statute negates or cancels the
pragmatic enrichment that all tangible objects are contemplated under the
statute. The defendant, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the
plurality, argued for opening the textual frame, first by looking at the rest
of the words in the phrase, “any record [or] document,” coupled with the
title of the statute, “Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in
Federal investigations and bankruptcy.”74 The plurality’s pragmatic
enrichment was that “tangible object” had to mean some objects like
documents and records. The coup de grace was the full phrase providing
that the defendant must “alter[], destroy[], mutilate[], conceal[], cover[]
67. NOURSE, supra note 13, at 106–07.
68. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015).
69. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
70. Id. at 1079.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2004).
72. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1081 (discussing government reading). Note that the pragmatic
enrichments I am suggesting are announced in the Courts’ various opinions; I am not creating
them. See id. at 1090–91 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“This case raises the question whether the term
‘tangible object’ means the same thing in § 1519 as it means in everyday language—any object
capable of being touched.”) (emphasis added). It is worth noting that the term “any,” which
appears before the term “report” in the statute, does not necessarily mean “all” or “every.” See
Any, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/any?s=t (last visited Oct. 29, 2017)
(defining “any” as referring to “a single one or ones; an unspecified thing or things; a quantity or
number”).
73. To be more precise, pulling the term “tangible object” out of the statute (isolationist
method), suggests an extension of the term (all tangible objects) not necessarily suggested by the
full statute.
74. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1083, 1085 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1519) (alteration in original).
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up, falsif[y], or make[] a false entry in any record, document or tangible
object.”75 The full phrase thus yields a further implication based on the
stereotypical meaning of the act of “false entry,” suggesting that
“tangible object” means some objects in which false entries can be
made.76
It should be clear by now that “isolationist” method creates the risk of
yielding apparent meanings that the whole statute may disavow—or at
least that isolationist method tends to negate statutory ambiguity by fiat.
This Part has aimed to show that: (1) isolationist arguments are made in
prominent Supreme Court cases; (2) such arguments tend to invite
pragmatic enrichments because narrowing the textual economy
(sometimes to a word or two) invites the reader to enrich the literal text;
and (3) the interpreters’ enrichments may be cancelled or negated if we
open the textual economy to include the whole text.
II. ISOLATIONIST METHOD: PICKING AND CHOOSING TEXTS
There is power in taking silent enrichments out of the shadows and
making them explicit. This Part argues that pragmatic enrichment theory
shows why isolationist textualism can lead to “picking and choosing”
texts. Finally, it explains why judges with widely differing theories of
interpretation pragmatically enrich textual meanings. As a matter of
linguistic philosophy, linguistic enrichment can be performed both by
liberals and conservatives, in statutory as well as constitutional law.
It turns out that both sides to an interpretive controversy typically
enrich meanings, suggesting that the enrichment, rather than the text, is
doing most of the interpretive work. In some cases, there are better
interpretations based on the whole text of the statute because the statute
cancels one side’s pragmatic enrichment or provides a far more plausible
competing enrichment. In other cases, there is only one proper
interpretation, leading to the conclusion that the opposing “enrichment”
is no enrichment, but the injection of policy preferences into the text.
A. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline77
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) bars
discrimination based on age.78 A union and a company agreed to protect
the health care benefits of persons over fifty, but eliminated such benefits

75. 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
76. Justice Samuel Alito’s concurring opinion relies heavily on the verbs in the statute. See,
e.g., Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1090 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he last phrase in the list—‘makes a false
entry in’—makes no sense outside of filekeeping.”).
77. 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012) (barring “discriminat[ion] . . . because of [an] individual’s
age”).
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to persons who retired at forty to fifty.79 Members of the younger class
sued for age discrimination.80 The majority, invoking purpose and
legislative history, came to the conclusion that the act did not cover
younger workers; the purpose of the act was to attack the stereotypical
notion that older persons were incapable of working at the same levels as
younger persons.81 The plaintiffs, and Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas in dissent, took the isolationist path, focusing on the
term “age.”82 The statute deems it unlawful for an employer “to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.”83 From this,
the plaintiffs drew a circle around the term “age,” and compared this nowexcised and decontextualized “ageless age” with other parts of the statute
in which “age” did not always mean “older age.”84 For example, younger
“age” might be a bona fide occupational qualification in a different
context (e.g., younger age might be a real reason to hire an undercover
investigator infiltrating a boarding school).85
The plaintiffs’ interpretation enriched the statute’s meaning by
suggesting a more encompassing rule: “any age discrimination, younger
or older, may be covered.86 Now, of course, the law does not say this; it
says “discrimination . . . because of age.”87 However “textualist” the
Scalia and Thomas opinion may appear, it rests upon adding meaning to
the text. The majority rejected the dissenters’ result but did precisely the
same thing: They relied upon their own pragmatic enrichment, reading
the statute to say, “discrimination because of relatively older age.”88 The
dissenters, who themselves had enriched the statute (“any” age) were
quick to charge that the majority was inserting the term “older” before
age.89 The statute does not say “all” ages, nor does it say “older” age.90
Both sides of the argument have added meaning to the text.

79. General Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 584.
80. Id. at 585.
81. Id. at 600.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
83. Id.
84. General Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 594–95.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 603 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The phrase ‘discriminate . . . because of such
individual’s age,’ 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), is not restricted to discrimination because of
relatively older age.”).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
88. General Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 603.
89. Id. at 604.
90. The real problem in this and other discrimination cases has to do with the differing
meanings of the term “discrimination.” The “thin” meaning suggests that any distinction yielding
harm is covered. The “thick” meaning suggests that there is a causal connection because the
reasons for the discrimination and the class affected (i.e., discriminating against women because
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The critic is likely to say we have reached stalemate. In fact, we have
refuted the notion that the “text” is doing the real work here. We know
from this analytic exercise that the case cannot be decided by isolating
the term “age” without adding meaning by pragmatic enrichment. Both
sides of the argument adopted conflicting meanings, so that the term
“age” cannot resolve the case. Pragmatic enrichment theory thus refutes
the conventional assumption that isolating text can decide cases by
objective means or by “plain meaning.” Pragmatic enrichments must “be
worked out” or articulated. This process of “working it out” illuminates
how an interpreter adds, rather than finds, meaning.
As a general rule, a judge does not believe she is adding meaning
when she focuses on a particular word or phrase in a statute. Pragmatic
enrichment theory forces the interpreter first to (1) articulate the
implicated assumptions (acknowledging addition and/or subtraction);
and (2) consider whether the whole text could negate or cancel an
enriched meaning (opening the inquiry to the whole text). The typical
judge, however, believes that she is simply finding linguistic equivalents
to the statute’s words. Once legislators have chosen the word, whether
the word is “state” or “age,” the judge looks to dictionaries or canons or
perhaps the common law as sources of meaning. The point is that adding
meaning starts before recourse to these sources, in the very choice of text
and its pragmatic enrichments.
B. West Virginia v. Casey91
Now that we are comfortable with the idea that isolation can lead to
apparent but enriched meanings, let us see how some choices of text can
be better than others based on the whole text. Consider the majority
argument in West Virginia v. Casey, a case about attorneys’ fees under a
civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.92 The majority opinion is a wellknown example of Justice Scalia’s application of “new textualism.”93 The
statute allowed a “reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs” of suit.94
The state of Pennsylvania argued that it did not have to pay witness fees,
only an “attorney’s fee.”95 The Supreme Court agreed.96
Let us focus on Pennsylvania Governor Robert Casey’s textual
argument against paying witness fees. The claim was that an “attorney’s
they are incapable of full participation in the workplace). See Philip P. Frickey, Wisdom on Weber,
74 TUL. L. REV. 1169, 1180 (2000).
91. 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
92. Id. at 84.
93. John F. Manning, Foreward: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV.
1, 22–23 (2013).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012).
95. Casey, 499 U.S. at 87.
96. Id.
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fee” meant fees for lawyers, not witnesses. This claim, however, trades
upon isolating the term “attorney” from the rest of the statutory phrase
“attorney’s fee” which is part of a larger phrase, “attorney’s fee as part of
the costs.”97 As we have seen above, the isolationist technique leads to
the pragmatic enrichment of meaning that only attorneys are covered by
the statute. Since attorneys are not witnesses, it appears to follow that
witness fees are excluded from compensation.
Isolating the words “attorney’s fee” enriches meaning to suggest that
only attorneys are covered.98 Now perform a different isolating move:
Isolate the word “costs.” By isolating that statutory term, we enrich its
meaning to suggest that only costs are covered by the statute. Witness
fees are costs of suit, so witness fees are not covered. The choice of text—
“attorney’s fee” or “costs”—leads to diametrically opposed enrichments,
and from those enrichments, diametrically opposed results. If the
interpreter picks the term “attorney’s fee,” then witness fees are out; if
the interpreter picks the term “costs,” then witness fees are in.
Contrast these “isolated” readings with a reading that seeks to give the
entire phrase a coherent meaning. “Attorney’s fee” is connected to cost
by an important relational term: “as part of.” This conveys a part/whole
relationship. “Attorney’s fees” is, by statute, a smaller subset of the larger
category, “costs.” Notice that the isolating method invites the enrichment
of text: By adding meaning (e.g., only states, only attorneys), it is also
capable of ignoring, and thus striking, text. Here, isolationist technique
effectively strikes “as part of.” Isolating “attorney’s fee” or “costs”
eliminates the relationship of fees to costs, namely that attorney’s fees are
a subset of a larger category termed “costs.”
If we give meaning to this relationship (“as a part of”), it cancels or at
least undercuts the enriched isolated meaning that only attorney’s fees are
covered. If costs include fees for attorneys and costs is a larger category
than attorney’s fees, it follows that costs may include other items than
fees to attorneys. If this analysis is correct, then isolating either the text
“attorney” or “cost” adds meaning to the text, and subtracts the whole
text’s internal relations.
Giving meaning to the whole text, including its relational language,
suggests Justice John Paul Stevens’s reading is the better textual analysis.
Because attorney’s fees are “part of the costs,” costs must be a larger
category and the statute cannot be limited to attorney’s fees alone. This
cancels the majority’s enriched meaning. We are still left to define
“costs.” Resolving that question is not within the scope of the text, but
requires additional information, pitting evidence from other statutes, as
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion argues,99 against legislative evidence on
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
98. Id.
99. Casey, 499 U.S. at 88–89 (listing fee-shifting statutes).
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the statute at issue, Section 1988, as Justice Stevens’s dissent argues.100
The point, however, should not be lost: The case cannot be decided based
on the literal text of the statute. Any interpretation that rests upon the
purported definition of “attorney’s fees” is one that both adds and
subtracts from the actual text.
C. Babbitt v. Sweet Home101
Finally, let us see how it is possible that a textual argument, via a
pragmatic enrichment, can inject purpose into text, turning textualist
theory on its head in textualist practice. Presumably, formalists do not
believe that this is what they are doing. When the pragmatic enrichment
deviates rather dramatically from the whole text, however, it can become
quite apparent that the interpreter has injected their own policy
preferences into the pragmatic enrichment, a move that textualism as a
theory should disavow. I believe that Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion
in the fish case, United States v. Yates,102 reflects this purposivism-undercover-of-textualism. There are, however, clearer examples, as in the
canonical textualist case, TVA v. Hill.103
The 1973 Endangered Species Act (ESA) barred the “taking” of any
endangered species and statutorily defined “take” to include a variety of
actions including “harm” to a species.104 In 1975, the Secretary of the
Interior issued a regulation governing significant habitat modification as
a form of statutory “harm.”105 In 1978, the Supreme Court decided TVA
v. Hill—a highly controversial case that stopped the building of a large
dam to save the habitat of a tiny fish, the snaildarter.106 In 1982, after
“heated debates” between environmental interest groups and industry,
Congress finally came to a bipartisan compromise, to simplify and
streamline the operation of the 1973 Act. The 1982 statute provided a
safety valve: It authorized permits for private actors who incidentally
“take” species.107 The question in Babbitt v. Sweet Home, then, was
whether the agency’s regulation was consistent with the statute.
Section 9(a)(1) of the ESA provided that it was “unlawful for any
person” to take any such species within the United States, and Section 14
specifically defined “take” as follows: “The term ‘take’ means to harass,
100. Id. at 108–11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing legislative history). It is worth noting
that Justice Stevens’s reading and the statute’s own language refute the notion that the term
“costs” is being used in its “technical” sense as meaning “court costs” such as filing fees, etc.
101. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
102. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
103. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
104. Id. at 184.
105. Id. at 185.
106. Id. at 194.
107. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2012).
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harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct.”108 “The Secretary ha[d]
promulgated a regulation that define[d] the statute’s prohibition on
takings to include ‘significant habitat modification or degradation where
it actually kills or injures wildlife.’”109 Justice Scalia’s dissent analyzed
the statute by isolating the word “take,” to exclude habitat regulation.110
Analogizing “take” to the common law and constitutional meaning of
“takings,” the dissent argued that “taking” meant only intentional actions,
like shooting or hunting.111 This definition excluded “habitat
modification” presumably because cutting down a forest was not
intended to kill animals, even if that was the result.
Let us consider the isolating method, focusing on “take” and severing
it from the statutory definition. Isolating the term “take” leads to the
enriched meaning that only takings are covered. Based on this pragmatic
inference, further inferences are added from the common law, the
constitutional idea of “takings,” and dictionaries. Of course, the statute
does not say any of these things. It does not say that “only actions like
take” are covered, and it does not say only “intentional takings” are
covered. In fact, it lists at least ten versions of what Congress meant by
“take,” including: “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” 112 It is
possible of course that all these ten could be “intentional” but the first
two “harass” and “harm” do not obviously qualify as takings.
Now let us consider an entirely different isolationist focus on the
statutory term “harm.” Section 19 of the ESA includes “harm[ing]”
endangered species. If we pull the term “harm” out of the statute, by the
sheer fact of isolation, we come up with precisely the opposite
conclusion, without pragmatic enrichment: (1) harm is literally covered
under the statute; (2) habitat modification harms endangered species; and
(3) habitat modification is covered under the statute. As we have seen
before, “isolating” the term “harm” yields precisely the opposite result
than if we pulled “take” out of the statute. More importantly, unlike the
dissent’s view, it provides this meaning without pragmatic enrichment.
And, if this were not enough, the 1982 amendments113 exempted
“incidental” takings, a concept highly incompatible with a common law
or constitutional reading of “taking.”
108. Id. § 1538(a)(1); id. § 1532(19).
109. Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687, 690 (1995) (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994)).
110. Id. at 717 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Id.
112. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
113. The 1982 amendments provided for an exception to the permitting requirement “if such
taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1982). This defines taking to include purposeful and non-purposeful
actions.
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Given this, one can only describe the dissent as injecting policy views
into the text of the statute. The statute does not say “only takings,” the
statute does not say “common law” taking, and the statute does not say
something like a “Fifth Amendment” taking. These are pragmatic
enrichments upon pragmatic enrichments that seem best explained by the
interpreter’s “policy preferences” for the common law meaning of taking,
the constitutional meaning of taking, or resistance to the regulation
altogether. As detailed elsewhere, if one doubts that “harm” cannot be cut
out of the statute, all one has to do is look at the best evidence of
context—a few pages of a committee report—to see that the authors of
the statute believed habitat modification covered.114 Any other
interpretation in the face of such clear interpretive evidence is
purposivism masquerading as textualism.
D. Theoretical Conclusions
What this Article has tried to show by this highly technical analysis is
something quite basic about textualism in practice as opposed to
textualism in theory. Textualism, as it is currently practiced, risks picking
and choosing text, without recognizing that this choice itself has meaning.
The result may well be arbitrary or contrary to the whole statute; it may
even assume that which it seeks to prove. For those who believe that they
can find “fixed” meaning in the text of the constitution and statutes, they
may not, in practice, be finding it in the text; they may be adding or
subtracting it based on their own pragmatic additions or subtractions.
Unacknowledged Additions or Subtractions. New textualists are
typically open about the fact that they will add information to the search
for textual meaning based on dictionaries, settled legal meanings, or even
the common law.115 Relative to adding these kind of sources, enriched
pragmatic meanings are far more powerful because they are silent. In
reaching out to dictionaries, or to the whole code, the interpreters’ method
is on display. For the true-hearted textualist, who rejects in principle the
notion of adding meaning to the text, the question remains whether the
very choice of text is in fact enriching meaning, and does so at the very
beginning of the analysis, before dictionaries, before canons of
construction, or any other acknowledged addition of information. If that
is true, it is not enough to claim, as have some, that the search is for
“ordinary meaning” or “plain meaning” or that the question is one of “text
versus purpose.” The choice of text is likely to have an extraordinarily
powerful effect upon the ensuing argument. Not only may it add or
subtract text, once the pragmatic enrichment is set (e.g., only attorneys’
114. Victoria F. Nourse, Decision Theory and Babbitt v. Sweet Home: Skepticism About
Norms, Discretion, and the Virtues of Purposivism, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 909, 920–23 (2013).
115. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 81–83 (2006).
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fees), then the interpreter will tend to seek confirming information,
colored by the original choice of text, amplifying the original judge-made
enrichment with other judge-made interpretive preferences.
Cancellation or Negation by the Whole Text. The point of this critique
is not to invite radical skepticism. The point is to argue that any
interpreter who looks at the text must acknowledge how enriched
meanings are created and how they may be cancelled by the whole text.
No modern textualist, nor any modern purposivist, rejects the whole text.
Enriched pragmatic theory offers a far more transparent, and rigorous
way to force analysis of the whole text, as opposed to little bits of it
(“isolationist textualism”). Illuminating unacknowledged enriched
readings can yield better interpretations, if better is measured by the
whole, rather than parts, of a text. It will not, in my opinion, answer hard
cases; more information will be required. Of course, this reinforces the
idea that text itself may be the beginning, but is unlikely to be the end, of
the analysis.
Assuming What One Is Trying to Prove. The worst part of isolationist
textualism is not that it fails to be candid (by failing to articulate added
or subtracted meanings) or fails to consider the whole text (by failing to
consider the possibility of cancellation or conflicting enrichments). The
worst problem is that it teaches the naïve interpreter that picking and
choosing words is all there is to statutory or constitutional interpretation.
Those choices, as we have seen, are often result-oriented: pick the word
“state” in the health care case, and the government loses; pick the words
“attorney’s fee” in Casey and the quest for witness fees fails. In both
cases, however, these are spurious textualist decisions once one looks at
the whole text. In both cases, one is left with the distinct impression that
the textual choice is a means for imposing a greater policy agenda—what
amounts to purposivism-under-cover-of-text.
III. THE INFORMATION ECONOMY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
For the past thirty years, statutory interpretation theory has moved
toward an increasingly information-poor economy of interpretation. New
textualists have insisted that interpreters reject legislative resources as
aids to statutory construction,116 and although not completely successful,
their arguments have intensified focus on small bits of text, thus reducing
the information available to statutory interpreters.117 To be sure, some

116. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 23, at 369, 388–89.
117. For an example of pluralist analysis in another era, see the real vehicles in the park case,
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26 (1931) which relies upon text, legislative history, and
canons. Pluralism actually traces to Blackstone.
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new textualists have also embraced canons of construction,118 but this is
a controversial position among textualists because it in fact adds to the
meaning of the text as passed by Congress.119 At the very least, the
insistent call to look to the text, whether the original public meaning of
text in constitutional interpretation or the plain meaning of text in
statutory interpretation, has the tendency to increase the likelihood that
the interpretive method used is “isolationist.”
Pragmatic enrichment analysis tells all interpreters, whether textualist
or purposivist, that they should avoid silent additions to the text or, at the
very least, they should acknowledge that these enrichments exist: “work
them out,” and then consider whether the full statute negates them. Less
obviously, this analysis suggests something interesting about the
conventional methods deployed by most judges—what will be called
“pluralism.” Pluralism refers to the conventional mode of analysis that
looks to multiples sources for meaning,120 including the whole text,
purpose, canons, and legislative history (or what should be called
“legislative evidence.”)121 Pluralism, and its analog in constitutional
interpretation, has been attacked as providing arguments that can trump
text and for failing to provide an answer to which kinds of arguments
trump others (canons or legislative evidence?).
Pragmatic enrichment theory suggests that pluralism may provide an
unnoticed advantage: It enriches the information economy. By contrast,
isolationist textualism impoverishes that economy, and creates the need
for silently enriched meanings. Enrichments exist because statements are
economical; their terseness invites interpreters to add information as any
ordinary reader trying to understand a communication. Isolationist
technique tends to exacerbate this economy by decreasing the amount of
interpretive information. Pluralism, on the other hand, adds information
to the interpretive economy, whether from the whole text, canons of
interpretation, legislative, or historical evidence. For this reason, based
on the sheer amount of information, plural methods—relative to
isolationist ones—may be more likely to reveal improperly enriched
meanings.
Today, pluralism is seen as a means of discovering a convergent
statutory meaning. My argument reverses the current approach toward
pluralism. It argues that pluralism has a function, even if inadvertent, as
118. Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
849, 853 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)).
119. Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 109
(2010).
120. See generally ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014) (explaining why
judges must examine the legislative record of a law to determine its meaning).
121. NOURSE, supra note 13, at 153–59.
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an antidote to isolationism. Adding information provides the possibility
of cancelling false, but apparent, enrichments. Today, pluralists tend to
start with text and then seek confirming evidence.122 In fact, that approach
may simply exacerbate the problems of falsely enriched meanings. As the
cognitive bias literature shows, our initial frames may be subject to
cognitive bias, which is only exacerbated by “confirmation bias.”123 If
this is correct, then pluralism, which increases the amount of information
in the interpretative economy, may be defended if it is used to search for
disconfirming evidence—evidence that may crudely or inadvertently, but
effectively, negate unacknowledged enriched meanings.
A. Whole Act and Linguistic Canons
Let us focus on the use of canons of construction as a means to cancel
isolationist implicatures. In Yates v. United States,124 the dissent isolated
the term “tangible object,” leading it to the conclusion that all tangible
objects were covered by the statute, and the dumping of undersize fish
was within the purview of a financial fraud statute.125 The silent
implicature was that the statute covered “all” tangible objects.126 Without
articulating it in these terms, Justice Ginsburg’s plurality opinion rejected
that conclusion, finding that the whole statute effectively “cancelled” the
dissent’s implicature by invoking the linguistic canons of construction
known as ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis.127 Ejusdem generis holds
that general words should be read to be consistent with the more specific
terms that precede them,128 in this case “records” and “documents.”
Noscitur a sociis tells readers to read lists of words consistently.129
Relying on these canons, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the Act as a
whole could not be explained by isolationist enrichment (all tangible
objects) because otherwise Congress would not have included words like
“record” or “document.”130 Instead, Congress would have written a
statute that said simply “any tangible object,” without any reference to
records or documents.131 Because ejusdem generis operates to limit the
reach of generalized terms, and noscitur a sociis limits the reach of a list
122. James J. Brudney, Confirmatory Legislative History, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 901, 901
(2011).
123. NOURSE, supra note 13, at 199–200.
124. 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1091 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1085–87.
128. See Kaushalya Kumari, Principles of “Ejusdem Generis”-“Noscitur a Sociis in
Taxation Laws, TOPCA FIRMS (Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.topcafirms.com/index.php/whitepaper/5716-principles-of-ejusdem-generis-noscitur-a-sociis-in-taxation-laws.
129. Id.
130. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1087.
131. Id.
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of terms to something they all share, each will tend to resist expansive
pragmatic enrichments like “all” tangible objects.
From this, one should not conclude that pragmatic enrichment theory
justifies all canons, but something quite a bit more modest: To the extent
that linguistic canons urge the interpreter to look at the “whole act,” they
will tend to resist isolationist method. Canons are now so various and
voluminous, not to mention terribly substantive, that canongeneralizations are hazardous.132 The linguistic canons are a small subset
of the entire range of canons. Nevertheless, one of the most interesting
things about the linguistic canons is that they have come to prominence
in our current isolationist age. For decades, canons like ejusdem generis
never soiled the pages of Supreme Court opinions to confound law
students, such canons seemingly felled by Professor Karl Lewellyn’s
wisdom that for every canon there exists a counter-canon.133 As we have
seen, however, the canons add information to the textual inquiry carrying
the potential to cancel the isolationist enrichment: In Yates, ejusdem
generis focuses attention on the terms “record” and “document” which
helps to cancel the original isolationist focus on “tangible objects.”134 To
the extent the canons require the interpreter to read the whole text, by
their nature they will tend to cancel unstated pragmatic enrichments (all
objects, only takings, all uses).
In this sense, the canons should be seen as a defensive, rather than
offensive tool, resisting isolationism, and reasserting the power of the
whole text. By “defensive use,” I mean use as a prophylactic against
isolationist readings. Today, the canons are conventionally seen as ways
to find, rather than make, the meaning of a statute. Judges aim to find
“plain meaning,” and if none is to be found, then they use canons or, in
the alternative, they use canons to confirm plain meaning. I have argued
that canons can be justified as resisting silent isolationist implicatures or
other enriched meanings. The reverse does not hold true, however. Using
canons to confirm a falsely enriched meaning simply amplifies the
original and potentially false enrichment. Consider Justice Kagan’s
dissenting opinion in Yates. She explains the ejusdem generis canon well:
It requires that the interpreter find a generalization.135 But the
generalization she finds is precisely the one she has created—the statute
is an obstruction of justice statute. If one does not recognize that the
canons are a means to disconfirm false but apparent enriched meanings,
132. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION:
LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 447–49 (2014) (describing the
various genres of canons of statutory interpretation).
133. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).
134. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1087.
135. Id. at 1097 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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then their use will simply aggravate the original isolationist move, adding
illusory inference upon false implications.
B. Legislative Evidence
A similar asymmetrical analysis applies to legislative evidence. The
Supreme Court and appellate courts continue to look to legislative history
in difficult cases.136 Even if one rejects that position, it is possible to see
legislative evidence in a more modest role, not in confirming textual
meaning, as the current Supreme Court employs it, but in rejecting silent
enrichments of meaning caused by isolationist technique.
Let us return to Sweet Home v. Babbitt.137 The isolationist move here
led to the enriched meaning “only takings.”138 In my view, the better
reading rejects the “only takings” enrichment because that eliminates the
term “harm” from the statute. If that were not enough, the legislative
evidence makes clear that Congress did not adopt the common law
meaning of “take,” much less an exclusive common law meaning. The
1982 amendments were specifically aimed at providing an exception for
those private projects threatening habitat modification. In the conference
committee report supporting the amendments, the very examples used
included habitat modification: A California development plan sought to
maintain the home of an endangered butterfly. There is no way to read
this conference report or its legislative history (the joint explanation)
without recognizing that Congress did not accept Justice Scalia’s
enrichment (only intentional “takings.”)139 The legislative evidence
openly and specifically addressed habitat modification, contrary to the
dissent’s “only intentional takings” construction of the statute.140
Similar results occur when we consider the legislative history in Yates
v. United States.141 There, an amicus brief handed the Supreme Court
legislative evidence disconfirming the dissent’s enriched meaning—“all
tangible objects.”142 Congressman Michael Oxley’s brief revealed a
cornucopia of evidence rejecting the “general obstruction of justice”

136. See Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative
History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 72 (2012).
137. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
138. Id. at 708.
139. See the analysis of the legislative evidence in Nourse, supra note 114, at 920–23
(describing the conference report that includes reference to habitat change as well as the debate
on the conference report—all of five pages—which also refers to habitat change).
140. The conference report’s joint explanation explains that private habitat modification was
covered by the 1982 Act: The term “habitat” was used over fifty times in a thirty-five-page report.
See id. at 920–23.
141. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
142. Brief for the Honorable Michael Oxley as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 20,
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (No. 13-7451).
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reading that results from the dissent’s enrichment (all tangible objects).143
Over a series of years, Congress had deliberately avoided enacting a
general obstruction statute (despite complaints by the Justice
Department), writing statute after statute keyed to specific kinds of
fraud—health care fraud, social security fraud—precisely because a
general statute could be a source of prosecutorial abuse. As the
government argued, the Judiciary Committee knew of problems applying
the ancient witness tampering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512, to standard
obstruction claims, problems that SOX fixed in a specific amendment
added on the Senate floor.144 The Yates prosecution, however, did not
proceed under the witness tampering statute; it proceeded under a new
records provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1519.145 In other words, the legislative
evidence disconfirms the dissent’s enrichment that “all tangible objects”
were covered.
Under this conception, legislative evidence is being used not to find
meaning or resolve ambiguity, but to negate apparent, but false,
enrichments of meaning. Reversing this procedure to find confirmatory
meanings may aggravate textual isolationism. The Yates dissent cited
legislative evidence to “confirm” its reading of the statute as including
every tangible object, including fish. Confirmatory readings are by
definition incapable of cancelling an enriched meaning. If legislative
evidence is to perform a cancellation function, the interpreter must look
to negate the enriched meaning, to find contrary evidence. Had the
dissent looked for evidence against its “all objects including a fish”
argument, it would simply have had to look at the relatively short debate
on this part of the bill—in which there is no mention of a general
obstruction statute and a great amount of talk about a new financial
records destruction statute.146 Instead, the dissent quoted legislative
evidence dealing with a different statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512, namely the
old witness tampering statute confirming its own pragmatic addition to
the only relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
IV. RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS
Some critics will object that it is impossible to read a text without
isolating words. Yes, that is what makes this Article important—it applies
to all interpretive activity. Isolation is necessary but insufficient to honor
the whole text. The best readings of text, according to textualists
themselves, consider the whole text. My own view is that textualists and
purposivists have undertheorized their actual approach to text by failing
to take account of pragmatic enrichment. The best interpreters will
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 21–23.
Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1084.
Id. at 1079.
148 CONG. REC. 14,449–50, 14,453, 14,497 (2002).
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oscillate back and forth between specific and general texts to determine
whether the pragmatic enrichment is consistent with the whole text, based
on the idea of the “hermeneutic circle.”147 The best interpreters will
realize that they are adding and subtracting meaning by pragmatic
enrichment, and will consult the best evidence of context—legislative
evidence—to falsify their interpretations.
Even in the simplest of statutes, one can see how interpreters
pragmatically enrich the text by choosing only a part of it. Consider a
statute that commands: “No vehicles in the park.” If the interpreter
isolates the term “vehicles,” one is left with all sorts of strange law
professor hypotheticals about baby carriages, wheelbarrows, and statues
(that is not a typo for statute, I mean statues). The implicit, but unstated,
pragmatic implication is that “no” vehicles means “all” vehicles. If one
opens the textual window to include the idea of “no vehicles in the park,”
one can posit a different enriched meaning, which is to say “parkappropriate” vehicles like baby carriages, wheelbarrows, and statues of
vehicles are obviously fine in the park. To be sure, this does not answer
all applications of the statute, but it does show that isolation of terms leads
to enriched meanings that may be entirely implausible to judges and
lawyers. Isolating the term “vehicle” and subtracting the term “park”
causes interpreters to assert what only law professors would assert—baby
carriages and wheelbarrows should be banned from parks. Even if one
disagrees with my interpretation, at the very least, this shows how
pragmatic enrichment theory applies to the most elementary cases.
Second, other critics will claim that this Article has engaged in a
picayune method, committing the very sins decried. To be sure, this
Article engaged in precise linguistic analysis. Formal arguments cannot
be defeated without formal responses. Elsewhere, I have made arguments
that petty textualism is likely to yield unfortunate results because of the
“focusing illusion” noted by behavioral economists; by limiting the
information economy to a few words, the very focus of the analysis can
occlude information needed for a rational decision.148 Formalists
however are unlikely to find this particularly persuasive because it
suggests a behavioral tendency the interpreter might overcome. My
admittedly formal analysis raises a different kind of challenge—whether
it is ever possible to overcome, on a formal basis, the pragmatic
implications that arise from choosing text. This applies not only to
textualists, but all interpreters; even purposivists start with text, and they

147. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1482, 1509–10 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 350–52 (1990).
148. See generally NOURSE, supra note 13 (discussing the negative effects petty textualism
can have on rational decision making).
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too are quite willing to enrich texts in ways that favor their policy
positions.
Third, critics will claim that this Article has not skewered textualism,
simply urged textualists and purposivists to be more candid about their
enrichments, or to be more willing to look at the whole text. My point is
not to skewer textualism; everyone is a textualist these days. Both
purposivists and textualists should have a better theory of textual choice.
This appears more of a problem for textualists because they claim to be
finding “plain” meaning or “ordinary” meaning. If I am right about these
examples, however, textualist and purposivist judges of all stripes, are
adding or subtracting meaning by pragmatic enrichment. One can quote
it from judicial opinions themselves. It is not enough for a judicial
interpreter to simply say they are looking at text; they must ask
themselves whether they are creating, rather than finding, text.
CONCLUSION
Methods of statutory interpretation have come to increasingly focus
on text, a development very few reject, including myself. Little attention,
however, has been paid to a tendency to focus on small bits of text and
how this picking and choosing of text can in fact invite inferences that
add, subtract, or change the meaning of the statute. Since this form of
“isolationism” is practiced by all kinds of interpreters—from textualists
to purposivists to originalists—it is time to shine a spotlight on the ways
in which the choice of text encourages the enrichment of meaning, and
may assume precisely that which it tries to prove. Pragmatic enrichment
analysis is not simply a critique of isolationist method, its analytics
require the interpreter to articulate the pragmatic enrichments attendant
upon the choice of text. It may also suggest why courts, despite a
shrinking information economy, still maintain pluralist methods. If
properly deployed, increasing the information economy can reject
apparent but false pragmatic enrichments by disconfirming them.
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